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Differential Privacy for Sequential Algorithms
Yu Wang, Hussein Sibai, Sayan Mitra and Geir E. Dullerud
Abstract— We study the differential privacy of sequential
statistical inference and learning algorithms that are charac-
terized by random termination time. Using the two examples:
sequential probability ratio test and sequential empirical risk
minimization, we show that the number of steps such algorithms
execute before termination can jeopardize the differential pri-
vacy of the input data in a similar fashion as their outputs,
and it is impossible to use the usual Laplace mechanism to
achieve standard differentially private in these examples. To
remedy this, we propose a notion of weak differential privacy
and demonstrate its equivalence to the standard case for large
i.i.d. samples. We show that using the Laplace mechanism,
weak differential privacy can be achieved for both the se-
quential probability ratio test and the sequential empirical risk
minimization with proper performance guarantees. Finally, we
provide preliminary experimental results on the Breast Cancer
Wisconsin (Diagnostic) and Landsat Satellite Data Sets from
the UCI repository.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a major concern in utilities involving statistical
inference from collected personal data, such as personalized
medicine, social media analysis, recommendation systems,
to name a few. Among various mathematical measures of
privacy, the research on differential privacy has flourished
during the past decade [1] and has been applied extensively
to various statistical inference, learning and optimization
problems [2]–[6]. Differentially private probably approxi-
mately correct (PAC) learning is based on a body of literature
established during the past decade; see for instance [7], [8]
and references therein.
Generally speaking, differential privacy requires the proba-
bility distribution of the output of an algorithm to not change
significantly when small changes are made to the inputs. The
extent to which the output of an algorithm varies as its input
varies is called sensitivity. A common approach to make
statistical inference and learning algorithms differentially
private is to first upper bound the sensitivity and then add
proportional random noise to the output [9]. This usually
results in a trade-off between the privacy of the data and the
accuracy of the learning.
Previously, differential privacy is mostly studied in terms
of statistical inference and learning algorithms that use fixed
numbers of samples. This is partly because, differential
privacy, at its inception, aimed at handling static databases
with known sizes [1], [10], and there is a natural connection
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between randomized query of databases and statistical infer-
ence and learning from a given set of samples. In these cases,
the sensitivity of the algorithms is usually provably bounded,
therefore the sensitivity based randomization mechanism can
ensure the differential privacy of the data.
In many cases, sequential algorithms are more efficient
and easier to implement, especially when there is a given
requirement on the accuracy of the result [11]–[15]. Gener-
ally, these sequential algorithms take one or a small number
of samples at each round and evaluate the quality of samples
gathered so far and the accuracy of prospective results using
some stopping condition. Then, they decide to draw more
samples if the evaluation fails, or give the final result oth-
erwise. Since these algorithms stop once the given accuracy
requirement is satisfied, they are usually more efficient than
their counterpart algorithms that use fixed sample numbers.
Recently, there is an effort to make sequential learning
and optimization algorithms differentially private [16]–[18].
This current work differs by treating the executed steps
before termination as observable to the outside world. The
varying termination time presents challenges to preserving
differential privacy, as it may change dramatically under the
alteration of a single datum value and thus reveal information
about its existence. Thus, achieving differential privacy for
these algorithms in the standard way is very difficult if not
impossible. This motivates us to propose a notion of weak
differential privacy, that is achievable for most sequential
algorithms.
Our notion of weak differential privacy is based on the
condition that the data used by the sequential algorithm
are drawn independently from some known distribution. On
average, the empirical distribution of these data is close to
this known distribution. We define weak differential privacy
so that the privacy of data is preserved in this average case.
A similar idea appears in [19], but there, the average is only
taken for unknown data.
Our notion of differential privacy is weaker than the
standard differential privacy, since the latter 1) does not
assume knowledge of the underlying distribution of the data
and 2) preserves the privacy of data in all cases including the
aforementioned average case. However, our weak differential
privacy implies standard differential privacy almost surely,
when the size of data is large.
For two classic sequential algorithms: sequential proba-
bility ratio test (SPRT) [20] and sequential empirical risk
minimization (SERM) [12]–[15], we show that weak differ-
ential privacy can be achieved by the common exponential
mechanism [9] with provably bounded loss of performance.
We also show this experimentally on two real-world data
sets: the Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic) and the
Landsat Satellite Data Sets, from the UCI repository.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give the
preliminaries and problem setups for sequential algorithms
in Section II. In Section III, we explain why achieving
differential privacy in the strict sense is difficult, and propose
the notion of weak differential privacy. In Section IV, we
achieve weak differential privacy for two classic sequential
algorithms: SPRT and SERM. In Section V, we show promis-
ing experimental results on the Breast Cancer Wisconsin
(Diagnostic) and the Landsat Satellite Data Sets from the
UCI repository. We conclude in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the differential privacy of a general sequential
algorithm A . The input algorithm is an (infinite) sequence
of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sample data
X = X1,X2, . . . referred to as a data stream, from some
probability space (Ω,Σ,P). Let Ω∗ = Ω∪ (Ω×Ω)∪ . . . be
the set of finite sequences taken from Ω. Then, a sequential
algorithm is defined as a tuple A = (TA , fA ), where
• TA : Ω∗→ {0,1} is a stopping condition, where 0 and
1 stand for false and true, respectively;
• fA : Ω∗ → O is a return function, where O is the set
of outputs of the algorithm A . The set O can be of
general type, such as binary or real numbers R.
The sequential algorithm A executes on a data stream X as
follows. Iteratively for n= 1,2, . . . if τ(X1, . . . ,Xn) = 1, then
A stops and returns TA (X1, . . . ,Xn); otherwise, it continues.
The number of iterations A executed on the data stream
X is denoted by τA and is referred to as the stopping step.
Mathematically, τA is a stopping time [21] defined on the
random process X , so we may also write it as τA (X). Below,
we introduce two examples of sequential algorithms.
A. Sequential Hypothesis Testing
A simple sequential algorithm is the sequential probability
ratio test (SPRT) [22]. It judges the correctness between two
hypothesis with bounded statistical error. Here, we consider
an SPRT algorithm A for two hypotheses on the parameter
p of a Bernoulli distribution
H0 : p= p0 H1 : p= p1, p0 < p1 (1)
with false positive (FP) ratio α and false negative (FN) ratio
β . Iteratively for n = 1,2, . . . the algorithm A takes the
sample Xn from the Bernoulli distribution and computes
Λn =
n
∑
i=1
ln
(
p
Xi
1 (1− p1)1−Xi
p
Xi
0 (1− p0)1−Xi
)
. (2)
The stopping condition is given by
TA =
{
0, if ln
(
β
1−α
)
< Λn <
(
1−β
α
)
,
1, otherwise.
(3)
And the return function is given by
fA =

0, if Λn ≤ ln
(
β
1−α
)
,
1, if Λn ≥ ln
(
1−β
α
)
.
(4)
Finally, the stopping step τA is finite with probability 1.
B. Sequential Empirical Risk Minimization
Another widely-used sequential algorithm is the sequen-
tial empirical risk minimization (SERM) [23]. Consider a
supervised learning problem of finding the minimizer fmin
from a class of functions F with finite VC-dimension on a
probability space (Ω,Σ,P):
fmin = argmin f∈F P( f ) = argmin f∈F
∫
Ω
fdP. (5)
This problem can be solved in the probably approximately
correct (PAC) sense with the usual empirical risk mini-
mization algorithm using samples of fixed sizes, computed
from the accuracy requirement and the VC-dimension of F .
However, it can be solved more efficiently via a sequential
empirical risk minimization algorithm proposed in [12]–[15].
Specifically, iteratively for n = 1,2, . . ., the SERM algo-
rithm A draws the samples Xn from the probability space
and compute the empirical Rademacher average
rF (n) =
1
n
sup
f∈F
∣∣∣∣∣
n
∑
i=1
σi f (Xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (6)
where σ1, . . . ,σn are i.i.d. Rademacher random variables,
taking values in {−1,1} with probability 1/2. The stopping
condition is defined by
TA =
{
1, if rF (n)< α and n> Nα ,β ,
0, otherwise.
(7)
where
Nα ,β =
2
α2
ln
2
β
(
1− e− α22
) (8)
And the return function is given by
fA = argmin f∈F
1
n
n
∑
i=1
f (Xi) (9)
It is guaranteed that the minimizer is probably approximately
correct (PAC)
P [|P( f erm)−P( f ∗)|> α]< β . (10)
III. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN SEQUENTIAL
ALGORITHMS
Now, we discuss the differential privacy of the sequential
algorithm A = (τA , fA ) defined in Section II. To begin
with, we recall that the input of A is a data stream X =
X1,X2, . . ., i.e., an (infinite) sequence of i.i.d. sample data
from a probability space. And the public observation of A
is twofold: the stopping step τA (X) (the iteration at which A
stops) and the value of the return function fA (X1, . . . ,XτA ).
Following the seminal work [10], we start to discuss the
differential privacy for the sequential algorithm A as fol-
lows. Generally, the algorithm A is differentially private, if
the value of the data stream X cannot be easily inferred from
the random public observations (τA (X), fA (X1, . . . ,XτA )).
This requires that the probability distributions of the (ran-
dom) public observations changes mildly with the value of
the data stream.
To formally capture this, we consider two data streams
that are only different in one entry [1].
Definition 1 (Adjacency): Two data streams X = X1,X2,
. . . and X ′ = X ′1,X
′
2, . . . are adjacent, if there exists K ∈ N
such that for any n ∈ N\{K}, it holds that Xn = X ′n.
Differential privacy requires for any two adjacent data
streams X and X ′, the probability distributions of the two
(random) public observations (τA (X), fA (X1, . . . ,XτA )) and
(τA (X
′), fA (X ′1, . . . ,X
′
τA
)) should be similar enough to sat-
isfy the following inequality.
Definition 2 (Strong Differential Privacy): A sequential
algorithm A = (τA , fA ) is (ε,δ )-strongly differentially
private, if
P
[(
τA (X), fA (X1, . . . ,XτA )
) ∈ O×{K}]
≤ eεP[(τA (X ′), fA (X ′1, . . . ,X ′τA )) ∈ O×{K}]+ δ
(11)
holds for any two adjacent data streams X = X1,X2, . . .
and X ′ = X ′1,X
′
2, . . ., K ∈ N, and O ⊆ O , where O is the
range of the return function fA . Specially, (ε,0)-strongly
differentially private is referred to as ε-strongly differentially
private.
We refer to Definition 2 as strong differential privacy, as
the condition (11) should hold for any two adjacent data
streams.
A. Difficulties for Strong Differential Privacy
Following Sections II-A and II-B, it is easy to check that
neither of the two example sequential algorithms is strongly
differentially private. The common approach to imposing
differential privacy on an algorithm is by randomizing the
public observation [9]. For simplicity, for the public obser-
vation of a sequential algorithm A , we focus on the stopping
step τA of a sequential algorithm A and ignore the return
function fA for now. If for two given adjacent data streams
X and X ′, the two stopping steps τA (X) and τA (X ′) are
nonrandom, and |τA ((X))− τA (X ′)| = D(X ,X ′) for some
D ∈N, then we should add a mean-zero Laplace noise with
parameter d2 to τA . When d > 1/εmaxX ,X ′ D(X ,X
′) for
some ε > 0, then the sequential algorithm A achieves ε-
strong differential privacy.
The above technique depends critically on the bounded-
ness of maxX ,X ′ D(X ,X
′), which is generally true for non-
sequential algorithms [1]. However, this condition is violated
for both sequential probability ratio test and sequential
empirical risk minimization from Sections II-A and II-B.
Sequential probability ratio test: Following
Section II-A, let N0 = |{i ∈ [n]|Xi = 0}| and N1 =
|{i ∈ [n]|Xi = 1}|.3 Then, the stopping condition (3)
2More specifically, a discrete-valued Laplace noise. The probability
distribution function satisfies fLaplace(x) ∝ e
|x|/d for x ∈ Z.
3Here, | · | stands for the cardinality.
can be expressed by
TA =

0, if N0−N1 <
ln 1−α
β
ln
p1
p0
and N1−N0 < ln
1−β
α
ln
p1
p0
,
1, otherwise.
(12)
Now consider two adjacent data streams
X = (
K1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . ,1, 1 ,−1,1,−1, . . .),
X ′ = (
K1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . ,1, −1 ,−1,1,−1, . . .).
For X , the algorithm A stops at τA(X) = K1+ 1, while for
X ′, the algorithm never stops. Thus, D(X ,X ′) = |τA ((X))−
τA (X
′)|=+∞.
Sequential empirical risk minimization: Following Sec-
tion II-B, consider the probability space of uniform dis-
tribution on {0,1,2} and the function class F = { f1, f2}
with f1({0,1,2})= {0,1,0} and f2({0,1,2})= {0,0,1}. Let
1/α < Nα ,β . Now, consider two adjacent data streams
X = (
Nα,β︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . ,0,, 1 ,0,0, . . .)
X ′ = (
Nα,β︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . ,0, 0 ,0,0, . . .)
For X , the algorithm A stops at τA(X) =Nα ,β +1, while for
X ′, the algorithm never stops. Thus, D(X ,X ′) = |τA ((X))−
τA (X
′)|=+∞.
B. Weak Differential Privacy
Noting the difficulties in deriving strongly differentially
privacy sequential algorithms, we propose a weak notion of
differential privacy. This is based on the fact that the data
stream X is drawn i.i.d. from a probability space (Ω,Σ,P).
Thus, encountering extreme cases like in Section III-A is
very rare. Even though achieving differential privacy for all
data streams. is virtually impossible, it is possible for most
data streams from that probability space.
Unlike strong differential privacy from Definition 2, weak
differential privacy focuses on the average probability dis-
tributions of the (random) public observations, when the
nth entry of a data stream X changes. This average is
derived by taking the expected value of the other entries,
denoted by X−n, with respect to their probability distri-
bution P. Thus, the average public observation is given
by EX−n
[
τA (X), fA (X1, . . . ,XτA ). By requiring that for any
entry n ∈ N, this average public observation only changes
slightly, we introduce the weak differential privacy below.
Definition 3 (Weak Differential Privacy): A sequential al-
gorithm A =(τA , fA ) is (ε,δ )-weakly differentially private,
if
P
[
EX−n
[
τA (X), fA (X1, . . . ,XτA )
]
∈ O×{K}
]
≤ eεP
[
EX ′−n
[
τA (X
′), fA (X ′1, . . . ,X
′
τA
)
]
∈ O×{K}
]
+ δ
(13)
holds for any two adjacent data streams X = X1,X2, . . . and
X ′ = X ′1,X
′
2, . . ., K ∈N, and O⊆O , where O is the range of
the return function fA . Specially, (ε,0)-weakly differentially
private is referred to as ε-weakly differentially private.
Definition 3 is indeed weaker than Definition 2, since
the condition (13) can be derived from the condition (11)
by taking conditional expectation on X−n. Finally, we note
that weak differential privacy is almost equivalent to strong
differential privacy, when τA is large, because the empirical
distribution of the samples converges to P almost surely.
Thus, we have the following relation between weak and
strong differential privacy.
Proposition 1: If a sequential algorithm A is (ε,δ )-
weakly differentially private, then it is (ε,δ )-strongly dif-
ferentially private almost surely for a random data stream,
as τA (X)→ ∞.
IV. WEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR SEQUENTIAL
ALGORITHMS
In this section, we apply the idea of weak differential
privacy to the sequential probability ratio test and the se-
quentially empirical risk minimization from Sections II-A
and II-B. We show that by randomizing a proper set of
parameters, weak differential privacy can be achieved on both
of them.
A. Sequential Probability Ratio Test
Following Section II-A, we design a weakly differentially
private sequential probability ratio test by first randomizing
the stopping condition. In (2), when a single sample is
altered, the log-likelihood ratio Λn changes its value by
d =
∣∣∣∣ln p1 (1− p0)p0 (1− p1)
∣∣∣∣ . (14)
So, to achieve ε-differential privacy, the stopping condition
should be randomized by
TA =
{
0, if l+∆ < Λn < u+∆,
1, otherwise.
(15)
where
u= ln((1−β )/α), l = ln(β/(1−α)), (16)
and
∆ ∼ Laplace( 1
εd
)I[−u,−l]. (17)
obeys the Laplace distribution confined to the interval
[−u,−l]. Now, (ε,exp(ε min{− lnα,− lnβ})/2)-weak dif-
ferential privacy is achieved for solely observing the stopping
step τA .
The return function fA of the algorithm should also
be randomized to achieve differential privacy. Here, we
adopt the exponential algorithm from [9] to guaran-
tee ε ′-differential privacy for solely observing the return
function. Combining the public observation of the stop-
ping step τA and the return function fA in the usual
way [1], we derive the the overall privacy level by
Algorithm 1 Weakly differentially private SPRT
Require: FP, FN rations α,β , privacy levels ε,ε ′
1: Draw ∆ from (17) with d,u, l from (14)(16)
2: Run SPRT with stopping condition (15)
3: Randomize the return by exponential algorithm by ε ′.
(max{ε,ε ′} ,exp(ε min{− lnα,− lnβ})/2). The discussions
above are summarized by Algorithm 1 and Theorem 1.
Finally, we check the statistical accuracy of Algorithm 1.
Since the stopping condition is random, the actual false
positive (FP) and false negative (FN) ratios αFP and αFN
of the proposed algorithm is random, and their expectations
satisfies
αFP ≤
∫
R
ε
2
e−(u+x) exp(εx)I[lnα ,− lnβ ]du≤
εα
1− ε , (18)
and similarly
αFN ≤ εβ
1− ε . (19)
Then, by combining the statistical error of the exponential
mechanism for the return function, we derive the following
result.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 is (max{ε,ε ′},exp(ε min{− ln
α,− lnβ})/2)-weakly differentially private with the ex-
pected false positive and false negative ratios less than
εα/(1−ε)+1/expε ′)+1) and εβ/(1−ε)+1/expε ′)+1),
respectively.
B. Sequential Empirical Risk Minimization
Following Section II-B, we design a weakly differentially
private sequential probability ratio test by first randomizing
the stopping condition. The sequential empirical risk min-
imization algorithm is already random due to Rademacher
random variables. This automatically gives a degree of
privacy.
To begin with, we consider the stopping step. For any
f ∈F , we note that f (Xi) obeys Bernoulli distribution with
parameter P( f ). For Rademacher random variables σi, we
have
1√
n
n
∑
i=1
σi f (Xi)→Gaussian(0,P( f )), n→ ∞, (20)
by Central Limit Theorem. Consequently, we have
1√
n
sup
f∈F
∣∣∣∣∣
n
∑
i=1
σi f (Xi)
∣∣∣∣∣→ |Gaussian(0,λ )|, n→ ∞ (21)
where λ = sup f∈F P( f ), as the process with the largest P( f )
will dominate as n→ ∞.
The probability of terminating at Nα ,β is
P[τ = Nα ,β
]
=
∫ αNα,β
0
√
2
λ piNα ,β
e
− x2
2λNα,β dx
≈
√
2λ
α2piNα ,β
e−
α2Nα,β
2λ
(22)
Thus, the log-likelihood ration of two adjacent data streams
with f (X1) = 0 and f (X
′
1) = 1 satisfies
ln
P [τ| f (X1) = 1]
P [τ| f (X1) = 0]
= ln
∫ αNα,β−1
0
√
2
λ pi(Nα,β−1)
e
− x2
2λ(Nα,β−1) dx
∫ αNα,β
0
√
2
λ pi(Nα,β−1)
e
− x2
2λ
(
N2
α,β
−1
) dx
≈
√
2
λ piNα ,β
e−
α2Nα,β
2λ ,
(23)
noting that αNα ,β ≫ 1 for α ≪ 1.
The probability of terminating at step τ +Nα ,β satisfies
asymptotically,
P
[
τ = Nα ,β
]
=
∫ ∞
0
pix
λ
√
1
(1−λ )τ3Nα ,β
e
− (αNα,β +x)
2
2λNα,β
e
− (x−ατ)2
2pi(1−λ) dx
(24)
where the second exponential comes from an inverse Gaus-
sian distribution describing first hitting. Again, the log-
likelihood ration of two adjacent data streams with f (X1) = 0
and f (X ′1) = 1 satisfies
ln
P
[
τ = Nα ,β | f (X1) = 1
]
P
[
τ = Nα ,β | f (X1) = 0
] ≈
√
2λ
α2piNα ,β
e−
α2Nα,β
2λ (25)
By (23) and (23), we know that the randomness in the
sequential learning algorithm gives the algorithm some level
of weak differential privacy.
The return function fA can be randomized by the ex-
ponential randomization algorithm proposed [8], [9] with
any ε . Then the overall privacy level will be max{ε,√
2/λ piNα ,βe
−α2Nα,β /2λ max{1,λ/α}}. The above discus-
sions are summarized by Algorithm 2 and Theorem 2.
Algorithm 2 Weakly differentially private SERM
Require: α > 0, β ∈ (0,1), ε > 0
1: Perform SERM with (α,β ).
2: Randomize return by exponential mechanism by ε .
Theorem 2: Algorithm 2 is max{ε,e−α2Nα,β /2λ max{1,
λ/α}
√
2/λ piNα ,β}-weakly differentially private.
In Algorithm 2, only the return function is randomized,
therefore its sample efficiency is still the same as the non-
private version. The accuracy of the algorithm will decrease
in the same way as non-sequential empirical risk minimiza-
tion [24], so the discussion is omitted.
V. CASE STUDIES
We implemented Algorithm 2 in Python and studied its
performance on two datasets from the UCI repository [25].
The Wisconsin Diagnostic Breast Cancer (WDBC) Data Set
consists of 569 instances with 32 attributes: 30 real-valued
input features, the diagnosis (M = malignant, B = benign)
and the patient ID. We excluded the IDs from the features.
Hence, we have a classification problem where the input
is 30-dimensional real vector and the output is one of two
classes. In such scenario, an analyst would need to preserve
the privacy of the patients while being able to provide a
classifier for a third party to diagnose new patients.
The Statlog (Landsat Satellite) Data Set consists of multi-
spectral values of pixels in 3× 3 neighborhoods in satellite
images with the class of the center pixels. Each pixel has
four integer values between 0 and 255 and its class can be
one of seven: red soil, cotton crop, grey soil, damp grey soil,
soil with vegetation stubble, mixture class (all types present),
and very grey damp soil. Hence, each instance consists of
36 integers between 0 and 255 and an integer between 1 and
7. Given the multi-spectral values of the 3×3 neighborhood
pixels of a pixel, the goal is to predicts its class. The data set
is separated to two: one for training with 4435 instances and
one for testing with 2000 instances. This data set is larger
than WDBC.
For each of the two datasets, we trained a 2-hidden layers
neural network classifier with 90 nodes in the first layer and
50 nodes in the second. We chose the activation functions at
all hidden nodes to be the Sigmoid function (S(x) = 1
1+e−x ).
The output layer is a Softmax function ( f (x) = e
x j
∑Kk=1 e
xk
).
Moreover, we restricted the values of all parameters to
[−2,2]. Training the best classifier is not the aim of the
experiments. They just aim to show the effect of different
levels of privacy on the accuracy of a good classifier We
chose α = 0.2, β = 0.2 for the experiments on the WDBC
data set and α = 0.1, β = 0.1 for the ones on the Statlog
data set.
To implement the exponential algorithm in Algorithm 2,
we impose a metric structure on the class of functions
F . Here, the metric can be equivalently defined on the
parameters of the neural network; and we take the ℓ1-norm
multiplied by 1000 on the vector of parameters, since the
trained parameters are mostly of order 0.01 to 0.1. In this
case, to achieve {0.1,0.2,0.5}-weak differential privacy, the
exponential algorithm requires adding independent Laplace
noise with parameter {100,200,500} to each parameter.
For each case, we repeated the following experiment 10
times: we randomly shuffled the training data set and then
ran Algorithm 2. Since the WDBC data set does not have a
separate testing data set, the remaining in- stances that were
not chosen as part of the training set would be considered as
a test set. If the test set is smaller than 50, the experiment
would be discarded and repeated again. We then trained
the neural net on the training set to get the empirical risk
minimizer by 10000 steps of size 0.001 of the ADAM
optimizer using cross entropy error. After that, we checked
TABLE I
WDBC DATA SET
Privacy level ε 0.1 0.2 0.5
Train. acc. 0.98 0.98 0.97
Test. acc. 0.9 0.91 0.92
Private train. acc. 0.86 0.93 0.96
Private test. acc. 0.79 0.91 0.9
Stopping time 368.2 344.9 358
TABLE II
STATLOG DATA SET
Privacy level ε 0.1 0.2 0.5
Train. acc. 0.88 0.89 0.89
Test. acc. 0.77 0.76 0.77
Private train. acc. 0.82 0.86 0.88
Private test. acc. 0.76 0.76 0.76
Stopping time 3213 2231 2079
the accuracy of the classifier on both the training and testing
data sets. The accuracy is the number of times the predicted
class was equal to the correct class divided by the size of
the data set. Then, we added to each of the parameters of
the neural net independent Laplace noise with mean zero
and exponential decay equal to the reciprocal of the term
in Theorem 2. Again, we computed the accuracy of the
new classifier on both the training and testing data sets.
Finally, we computed the average of the results over the 10
repetitions along with the average size of the training data set
(equivalently, the average of the stopping time). The results
are shown in Tables I and II.
From Tables I and II, as ε increases the differences be-
tween the private and non-private accuracy values decrease.
That is because the exponential decay value of the Laplace
noise added to the parameters decreases as ε increases. How-
ever, the level of privacy decreases as ε increases. Therefore,
these tables show the trade-off between the performance and
the privacy level. The stopping time is not related to ε and
its variation between the different columns in both tables is
just due the inherent randomness of the stopping time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we studied the differential privacy of se-
quential statistical inference and learning algorithms that are
characterized by random termination. First, we demonstrated
that for sequential probability ratio test and sequential empir-
ical risk minimization, the number of steps executed before
termination can leak information about the input data. Fur-
thermore, we showed that it is impossible to design strictly
differentially private versions of the algorithms. Thus, we
proposed a weaker notion of differential privacy and proved
that they are approximately equivalent when the inputs are
a large number of i.i.d. samples. Then, we designed weakly
differentially private versions of both the sequential proba-
bility ratio test and sequential empirical risk minimization
algorithms with proper performance guarantees. Finally, we
showed that the performance loss of the weakly differential
privacy algorithms are reasonably small on the Breast Cancer
Wisconsin (Diagnostic) and Landsat Satellite Data Sets.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Dwork and A. Roth, “The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential
Privacy,” Foundations and Trends R© in Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 9, no. 3-4, pp. 211–407, 2013.
[2] M. J. Kusner, J. R. Gardner, R. Garnett, and K. Q. Weinberger, “Dif-
ferentially private Bayesian optimization,” in Proceedings of the 32nd
International Conference on International Conference on Machine
Learning - Volume 37, ser. ICML’15. Lille, France: JMLR.org, Jul.
2015, pp. 918–927.
[3] Z. Huang, Y. Wang, S. Mitra, and G. E. Dullerud, “On the cost of
differential privacy in distributed control systems,” in 3rd International
Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems (HiCoNS), 2014,
pp. 105–114.
[4] P. Jain and A. Thakurta, “Differentially Private Learning with Kernels,”
in International Conference on Machine Learning, Feb. 2013, pp. 118–
126.
[5] R. Rogers, A. Roth, A. Smith, and O. Thakkar, “Max-Information,
Differential Privacy, and Post-selection Hypothesis Testing,” in 2016
IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), Oct. 2016, pp. 487–494.
[6] Y. Wang, S. Mitra, and G. E. Dullerud, “Differential privacy and
minimum-variance unbiased estimation in multi-agent control sys-
tems,” in 20th IFAC World Congress (WC), IFAC-PapersOnLine, ser.
20th IFAC World Congress, vol. 50, Jul. 2017, pp. 9521–9526.
[7] S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova,
and A. Smith, “What Can We Learn Privately?” SIAM Journal on
Computing, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 793–826, Jan. 2011.
[8] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth, “A learning theory approach to
noninteractive database privacy,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 60, no. 2,
pp. 12:1–12:25, May 2013.
[9] F. McSherry and K. Talwar, “Mechanism Design via Differential
Privacy,” in Foundations of Computer Science, 2007. FOCS ’07. 48th
Annual IEEE Symposium On, Oct. 2007, pp. 94–103.
[10] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” in Automata, Languages and Pro-
gramming. Springer, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[11] T. L. Lai, “Sequential analysis: Some classical problems and new
challenges,” Statistica Sinica, pp. 303–351, 2001.
[12] M. Vidyasagar, “Randomized algorithms for robust controller synthe-
sis using statistical learning theory,” Automatica, vol. 37, no. 10, pp.
1515–1528, Oct. 2001.
[13] ——, “Statistical learning theory and randomized algorithms for
control,” IEEE Control Systems Magazine, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 69–85,
Dec. 1998, conference Name: IEEE Control Systems Magazine.
[14] V. Koltchinskii, C. Abdallah, M. Ariola, P. Dorato, and D. Panchenko,
“Improved sample complexity estimates for statistical learning control
of uncertain systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 45, no. 12, pp. 2383–2388, Dec. 2000, conference Name: IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control.
[15] V. Koltchinskii, C. T. Abdallah, M. Ariola, and P. Dorato, “Statistical
learning control of uncertain systems: Theory and algorithms,” Applied
Mathematics and Computation, vol. 120, no. 1, pp. 31–43, May 2001.
[16] M. Ghassemi, A. D. Sarwate, and R. N. Wright, “Differentially Private
Online Active Learning with Applications to Anomaly Detection,” in
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security, ser. AISec ’16. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016, pp.
117–128.
[17] P. Jain, P. Kothari, and A. Thakurta, “Differentially Private Online
Learning,” arXiv:1109.0105 [cs, stat], Sep. 2011.
[18] J. Tsitsiklis, K. Xu, and Z. Xu, “Private Sequential Learning,” in
Conference On Learning Theory, Jul. 2018, pp. 721–727.
[19] B. Yang, I. Sato, and H. Nakagawa, “Bayesian Differential Privacy
on Correlated Data,” in Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGMOD
International Conference on Management of Data, ser. SIGMOD ’15.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015, pp. 747–762.
[20] A. Wald, “Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses,” The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. pp. 117–186, 1945.
[21] B. Hajek, Random processes for engineers. Cambridge university
press, 2015.
[22] G. Casella and R. L. Berger, Statistical inference. Duxbury Pacific
Grove, CA, 2002, vol. 2.
[23] J. Friedman, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani, The elements of statistical
learning. Springer series in statistics New York, 2001, vol. 1, no. 10.
[24] K. Chaudhuri, C. Monteleoni, and A. D. Sarwate, “Differentially
private empirical risk minimization,” Journal of Machine Learning
Research, vol. 12, no. Mar, pp. 1069–1109, 2011.
[25] D. Dua and C. Graff, “UCI machine learning repository,” 2017.
